Every inspection and every maintenance record in this chapter exists to inform one decision: whether the aircraft flies. § 107.15(b) is the rule that governs it — once the remote pilot in command knows or has reason to know the aircraft is no longer in a condition for safe operation, the flight may not proceed. Note the strength of the word: not “should reconsider,” not “may want to delay,” but may not. A known defect is not a risk to be weighed against the day’s schedule; it is a stop.

AC 107-2A turns that rule into a practice with two steps. First, when a preflight check or a mishap reveals a component that needs servicing or repair, the guidance is that flight operations should not occur until the issue is corrected. Second, if the operator cannot restore that component to its safe operational condition — cannot repair, modify, or overhaul it back to specification — the guidance is to replace it with one that is in a condition for safe operation, with all required maintenance completed before the aircraft flies again. There is no middle path where a marginal part is flown “carefully”; it is fixed, replaced, or grounded.

This is where the chapter meets the remote pilot’s final authority from Chapter 2. The go/no-go call on the aircraft’s condition belongs to the remote pilot in command, and § 107.15 gives that authority teeth: the same person who answers for the flight is the one who must ground the aircraft when it is not safe. A client’s deadline, a tight weather window, or a quiet hope that a part will hold does not change the answer. The program tells you the aircraft’s condition; § 107.15(b) tells you what to do the moment that condition is in doubt — you do not fly.